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This study empirically investigates the impacts of central government 
budget deficits and economic freedom on per capita real economic growth 
in OECD nations over the period 2003–2008. Economic growth is 
measured by the percentage growth rate of purchasing-power-parity 
adjusted real per capita GDP. Within the context of the Fixed Effects Model, 
panel two stage least squares (P2SLS) estimations using a six-year panel data 
set for 29 of the 30 the OECD member nations as of 2008 as a group 
reveal that economic growth is a decreasing function of higher central 
government budget deficits and an increasing function of economic freedom. 
It is suggested that governments can best promote real economic growth by 
limiting the size of their budget deficits (relative to GDP) and pursue 
policies consistent with increasing various forms of economic freedom. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the end of the Great Recession, economic growth in the 
United States has been anemic, and the unemployment rate in the 
United States has remained stubbornly high, the extraordinary 
policies of the Federal Reserve in purchasing massive quantities of 
toxic assets and U.S. Treasury issues notwithstanding. As this slow 
growth-high unemployment scenario has played out, two very 
interesting controversies have arisen. The first involves the massive 
size of U.S. federal budget deficits, whether measured in dollar terms, 
inflation-adjusted dollars, or as a percentage of GDP, and the 
argument that such deficits are both unsustainable and have 
contributed to the stubbornly poor performance of the U.S. economy 
(El-Shagi, 2010; Gartner, Griesbach, and Jung, 2011). The second 
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controversy deals with economic freedom and findings that 
economic freedom in the United States has fallen and that the United 
States is now ranked only 19th among nations in the world in the 
overall level of its economic freedom (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall, 
2012).  Arguably, this diminished economic freedom has also 
contributed to the stubbornly poor performance of the U.S. 
economy.  
Given these two sets of circumstances, this study empirically 
investigates whether higher budget deficits and reduced economic 
freedom do in fact reduce economic growth and thereby raise 
unemployment. In particular, the fundamental purpose of this study 
is to investigate empirically not only the impact not only of central 
government budget deficits (as a percentage of GDP) on per capita 
real economic growth but also of the principal forms of economic 
freedom on per capita real economic growth. In the latter case, the 
focus is on the economic freedom measures developed by the 
Heritage Foundation (2013). The empirical findings in this study 
affirm that both controversies are well founded, namely, that large 
budget deficits and reduced economic freedom do in fact reduce 
economic growth. 
Background for the empirical model is presented in the following 
section of this study. The model and data are described in Section III. 
The empirical analysis is provided in Section IV, where multiple 
estimates are undertaken. The first takes the form of a P2SLS (panel 
two stage least squares) estimation of the basic model using recent 
data from the OECD nations. Additional P2SLS estimates are then 
provided to test the robustness of the initial results. An overview is 
provided in the final section. The investigation is undertaken using a 
six-year panel data set for OECD nations covering the period 2003–
2008.  
The empirical evidence provided in this study shows that the 
pattern of massive budget deficits begun under the Bush 
Administration (2001–2009) but greatly expanded under the Obama 
Administration (since 2009) has created a persistent negative impact 
of per capita real GDP growth in the United States. This condition 
cannot be allowed to continue if economic freedom and growth are 
the desired outcomes of a healthy economy. Likewise, the pattern of 
declining economic freedom, which also began under the Bush 
Administration (2001–2009) but became greatly exacerbated under the 
Obama Administration (since 2009), must be quickly and significantly 
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reversed. The stakes are high. This dual impact on U.S. prosperity, 
jobs, and living standards will be economically and indeed socially 
devastating if permitted to continue and will ultimately relegate the 
United States to the status of a second-class economic citizen in the 
global economy.   
This study significantly extends the recent study in this journal 
(Cebula, 2011) in a number of ways, including emphasis on the 
impact of the central government budget deficit on per capita real 
GDP growth, a variable that was not considered in Cebula (2011), 
the addition of an additional year of data to the panel (which permits 
the inclusion of the full year 2008 of the Great Recession), estimation 
within the context of the Fixed Effects model, and omission of the net 
exports/GDP variable, which could be critiqued as presenting a 
specification issue because net exports are part of GDP.1 
 
II. Relevant Background  
Sanz (2011, p. 753) recently observed that in recent years 
“…OECD member nations have dramatically worsened their public 
finances…” Indeed, “Developed nations [as a group] will [have] 
increase[d] their public deficit to 8.8% of GDP in 2010, compared 
with the 2.1% (on average) of GDP for the period extending between 
2000 and 2007…” (Sanz, 2010, p. 753). Since at least the beginning 
of 2010, increased concern over the debt/deficit/default issue in 
Greece has spread to Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and (G8 nation) Italy, 
all of which face significant economic and fiscal challenges. There is 
concern that if Greece goes down, so too will the economies of other 
nations, i.e., an “economic domino effect” will occur.2, Furthermore, 
the government deficit/debt circumstances of such major economies 
as those of the United Kingdom and the United States have also 
surfaced. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, there 
has been concern about actual and anticipated government budget 
deficits being financially unsustainable. Indeed, the deficit/national 
debt problem in the United States, the world’s largest economy, 
                                                
1 The present study also omits the “political stability” and” interest rate” variables 
that were included in Cebula (2011) because they are highly correlated with the 
budget deficit variable present in and so focused upon in this analysis. Also, unlike 
Cebula (2011), which includes PLS estimates, only P2SLS estimates are provided 
here; this is due to contemporaneousness of economic growth and the budget 
deficit in the model.  
2 Regarding such “contagion,” see the relevant study by Melander et al. (2011). 
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became so disconcerting that the S&P (Standard & Poor’s) bond 
rating service downgraded U.S. Treasury debt as of 2011 to AA+ 
with a negative outlook; this negative outlook carries with it the 
prospect of a further downgrade in the future, possibly to AA, absent 
substantive progress at controlling what appear to be excessive 
deficits in the United States (El-Shagi, 2010; Gartner, Griesbach, and 
Jung, 2011). Demonstrating further the failure to resolve government 
debt crises as well as the seriousness of those crises, S&P in January 
2012 issued debt downgrades for G8 nations France and Italy as well 
as for two other European nations, Austria and Spain.  
According to the conventional wisdom, large government budget 
deficits (relative to a nation’s GDP), such as those in Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
elsewhere, in theory can result in crowding out of the private sector, 
i.e., result in reduced capital formation and/or reduced household 
outlays through a variety of complex mechanisms (David and 
Scadding, 1974; Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1978, 1995; 
Guseh, 1997) and thereby induce reduced real economic growth and 
lower living standards for the populace. Accordingly, a primary 
purpose of this study is to investigate empirically whether larger 
central government budget deficits (expressed as a percent of GDP) 
do in fact act to reduce the growth rate of per capita real GDP.  
Furthermore, within the context of the continuing global 
economic and financial crisis surrounding the deficits and 
outstanding national debts of many sovereign nations, several policy 
concerns of the OECD have surfaced. One of these is reflected in 
the words of the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria (OECD, 
2009), who has stressed that policymakers must ensure that today’s 
economic and political policies to manage the crisis not be the source 
of tomorrow’s economic problems. The OECD has been working 
with its own members and, to a degree, with non-member 
governments and other organizations, to get economies back on the 
path of economic stability and expansion. Interestingly, as a central 
part of this effort, the OECD (2009) advocates the position that 
governments must be cautious not to jeopardize or sacrifice economic 
freedoms as they pursue policies to strengthen and revitalize their 
economies.  
In point of fact, macroeconomic growth and its determinants 
have been studied for decades. During the last two decades, a variety 
of studies have been conducted to investigate the linkage between 
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economic growth and economic freedom per se. These studies, which 
are predominantly empirical in nature, generally find a strong, 
positive impact of economic freedom on the rate of economic 
growth (Ali, 1997; Barro, 1997; Clark and Lawson, 2008; Dawson, 
1998; De Haan and Siermann, 1998; De Haan and Sturm, 2000; 
Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Tortensson, 1994; Gwartney, 
Holcombe, and Lawson, 2006; Gwartney and Lawson, 2008). Indeed, 
Cole (2003, p. 196) finds that “…economic freedom is a significant 
factor in economic growth, regardless of the basic theoretical 
framework.”  
This empirical study focuses principally on the relationship 
between economic growth on the one hand and (a) central 
government budget deficits (expressed as a percentage of GDP) and 
(b) economic freedoms such as fiscal freedom and freedom from 
excessive government size on the other hand. Clearly, a central 
concern in this study is that larger central government budget deficits 
lead to greater crowding out and hence diminished economic growth. 
In addition, the present study shares the concern of the OECD 
(2009) that a reduction in economic freedom will result over time in 
diminished economic growth. 
In this study, following conventional procedures that deal with 
growth rates among different nations, economic growth is measured 
by the percent change in the purchasing-power-parity adjusted per 
capita real GDP (PCTCHRPCY). Given that the OECD is expressly 
concerned with achieving economic growth without compromising 
economic freedom, the framework for the study consists solely of the 
nations that comprise the OECD.  
 
III. The Basic Empirical Model   
As observed above, economic growth is measured as the percent 
change in the per capita real GDP over the study period, 
PCTCHRPCY, a measurement that follows most of the more recent 
related studies on macroeconomic growth (Tortensson, 1994; Cebula, 
2011; Goldsmith, 1995; Ali, 1997; Nelson and Singh, 1998; Norton, 
1998; Dawson, 1998, 2003; Cole, 2003; Gwartney, Holcombe, and 
Lawson, 2006). The value of PCTCHRPCY is made comparable 
across nations by PPP (purchasing-power-parity) adjustments. In 
turn, following several studies focused on economic growth 
(Tortensson, 1994; Goldsmith, 1995; Ali, 1997; Barro, 1997; Nelson 
and Singh, 1998; Norton, 1998; Dawson, 1998, 2003; Cole, 2003; 
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Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson, 2006), it is hypothesized in this 
eclectic model that economic growth depends upon (a) central 
government budget deficits and (b) economic freedom 
(FREEDOM), such that 
 
PCTCHRPCYjt = f(DEFYjt, FREEDOMjt)          (1) 
 
where PCTCHRPCYjt is the percent change in the purchasing-
power-parity adjusted per capita real GDP (RPCY) in OECD nation j 
in year t; DEFYjt is the ratio of the central government budget deficit 
in country j in year t to the nation’s GDP in year t, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP;3 and FREEDOMjt refers to the values of 
economic freedom measures (indices) in nation j in year t. 
In accordance with much of the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on budget deficits and crowding out, it is expected that the 
higher the level of DEFY in a nation over a given time frame, the 
greater the degree of crowding out of private sector investment and 
consumer purchases of durables (including housing) and hence the 
slower the economic growth rate (David and Scadding, 1974; Carlson 
and Spencer, 1975; Abrams and Schmitz, 1978; Arestis, 1979; Cebula, 
1978, 1995; Guseh, 1997; Dawson, 1998), ceteris paribus. Indeed, this 
perspective of a negative impact of budget deficits on economic 
growth has often taken the form of studies that find that higher 
budget deficits raise interest rates and thereby reduce the pace of 
economic growth through reductions in investment and other private 
sector spending, often referred to as “transactions crowding out” (Al-
Saji, 1992, 1993; Barth, Iden, and Russek, 1984, 1985; Cebula, 1997; 
Cebula and Cuellar, 2010; Findlay, 1990; Gissey, 1999; Hoelscher, 1986; 
Tanzi, 1985; Zahid, 1988). 
Next, it is observed that the Heritage Foundation (2013) has 
developed ten measures of economic freedom, eight of which are 
formally considered in this analysis. The two economic freedom 
measures omitted from the study (labor freedom and freedom from 
corruption) share the common trait that their presence in the model 
introduces significant multicollinearity problems into the estimates. 
The eight economic freedom measures investigated here are 
described below. 
                                                
3 Expressing a budget deficit as a percent of GDP permits comparison to the size 
of the economy. 
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Fiscal freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2013), FF, reflects the 
freedom of individuals and firms to keep and control their income 
and wealth for their own use and benefit. A government can impose 
fiscal burdens on economic activities by generating revenues for 
itself—primarily through taxation.4 In any event, the higher the FF 
index, the greater the freedom from government on the tax/revenue 
side and the greater the rate of economic growth.  
The second economic freedom from the Heritage Foundation 
(2013) stressed in this study is freedom from excessive government size, or 
simply government size freedom, GSF (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This 
index of economic freedom reflects the degree of freedom in an 
economy from the burden of excessive government in terms of expenditures, i.e., 
freedom from excessive government on the expenditure (as opposed to 
revenue or tax) side.5 The higher the GSF index, the greater the 
freedom from excessive government size on the expenditure side and 
the greater the rate of economic growth. 
In addition to FF and GSF, this study considers the economic 
growth implications of six additional economic freedom measures: 
PROPRITF (property rights freedom), FINF (financial freedom), TF 
(trade freedom), MF (monetary freedom), BF (business freedom), 
and IF (investment freedom), data for which were obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation (2013).   
The variable PROPRITF is an economic freedom index 
measuring the degree to which the property rights of a nation’s 
citizenry are protected. The capacity to accumulate private property 
and wealth is arguably one of the primary motivating forces in a 
market economy.6 Presumably, the greater the degree of property 
                                                
4 Fiscal freedom, then, is a measure of freedom from the burden of government 
from the revenue side. The underlying idea is that higher taxation on the one hand 
interferes with the ability of individuals and businesses to pursue their goals in the 
marketplace and on the other hand may reduce, at least to some degree, the 
incentive to work, save, or invest. 
5 Government outlays necessarily compete with private agents and interfere with 
natural market processes and prices by over-stimulating demand, potentially 
diverting resources through a “crowding out” effect. 
6 Secure property rights provide both citizens and firms with the confidence and 
ability to undertake commercial activities, take risks, save the rewards of their 
efforts, and both formulate and execute long-term planning because of the 
knowledge that their income, savings, and property accumulation are safe from 
expropriation by government or other economic agents as well as from outright 
theft (Heritage Foundation, 2009, pp. 14–15).  
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rights freedom, the greater the extent of free-market activities and the 
greater the pace of real economic growth (Heritage Foundation, 
2013).7 
According to the Heritage Foundation (2013), financial freedom 
(FINF) is associated with the fact that essentially all nations impose 
some form of supervision of banking institutions and providers of 
other financial services. In theory, such supervision is intended to 
promote the safety and soundness of the financial system and to 
ensure that the financial service industry conforms with fiduciary 
responsibilities. However, excessive banking and financial regulation 
by government restricts competition, interferes with firm efficiency, 
and elevates the costs of entrepreneurial activity. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that the greater the degree of financial freedom, the 
greater the rate of economic growth should be.   
Trade freedom (TF) “…reflects the openness of an economy to 
imports of goods and services from around the world and the ability 
of citizens to interact freely as buyers and sellers in the international 
marketplace” (Heritage Foundation, 2013). In principle, free trade 
agreements between nations are predicated on the expectation that 
such agreements increase trade freedom and thereby increase 
economic growth. Accordingly, in this study, economic growth is 
hypothesized to be an increasing function of TF. 
Monetary freedom (MF), “…reflected by a stable currency and 
market-determined prices, is to an economy what free speech is to 
democracy. Free people need a steady and reliable currency as a 
medium of exchange and store of value. Without monetary freedom, 
it is difficult to create long-term value…” (Heritage Foundation, 
2013). Hence, the greater the value of MF, the greater the real 
economic growth rate that is expected.   
Business freedom, BF, addresses an individual’s right to create, 
operate, and close an enterprise without interference from the state 
(government). It is argued that burdensome, redundant regulations 
are the most commonplace barriers to the free conduct of 
entrepreneurial endeavors. In effect, regulations are regarded as a de 
facto “…form of taxation that makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to 
                                                
7 Interestingly, even in a society/economy such as China (which is not among the 
nations formally studied here), economic growth and development during the 
“…boom years have been accompanied by greater property rights…” (Osnos, 
2010, p. 44).   
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create value...” (Heritage Foundation, 2013). It is expected that the 
greater the degree of business freedom, the greater the rate of 
economic growth. 
Restrictions on foreign investment tend to limit capital inflows 
and outflows and interfere with the ability of capital to flow to its 
best and most efficient use. Governmental actions that redirect the 
flow of capital interfere with both the freedom of investors and the 
freedom of people and firms seeking that capital (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013). Investment freedom, IF, is greater in a nation 
with fewer restrictions on investment, such that greater investment 
freedom promotes greater economic growth.   
Technically, it is clear that the economic freedoms may interact, 
although the exact mechanisms for this interaction are not easily 
identifiable (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This “interaction” takes the 
form of a high zero-order correlation coefficient, r.  Indeed, two of 
the ten measures of economic freedom compiled by the Heritage 
Foundation (2013), namely, labor freedom and freedom from 
corruption, have extremely high r-values with respect to several of 
the other variables in the model; hence, they are excluded from the 
analysis. In any case, the Heritage Foundation (2013) weights each 
economic freedom measure equally to prevent bias toward any given 
freedom or policy.  Each of the economic freedoms is graded using a 
scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the maximum freedom.8 
As observed in the above text, it is hypothesized (ceteris paribus) that 
per capita real economic growth is an increasing function of each of 
the economic freedom measures considered here: FF and GSF, 
PROPRITF, FINF, TF, MF, BF, and IF. 
Substituting FF, GSF, PROPRITF, FINF, TF, MF, BF, and IF for 
FREEDOM in equation (1) yields: 
 
PCTCHRPCYjt = f(DEFYjt, FFjt, GSFjt, PROPRITFjt, FINFjt,  
TFjt, MFjt, BFjt, IFjt),              (2) 
 
where it is hypothesized that: 
 
 
                                                
8 The higher the numerical value of any one of these economic freedom indices, 
the greater the degree of that corresponding economic freedom. An index score of 
100 indicates an economic environment or set of public policies that is the most 
conducive to and compatible with economic freedom. 
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fDEFYjt < 0, fFFjt > 0, fGSFjt >0, fPROPRITFjt > 0, fFINFjt > 0, fTFjt >0,  
fMFjt > 0, fBFjt > 0, fIFjt > 0.             (3) 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis: Panel Two Stage Least Squares 
Estimates 
Given the variables identified in equations (1)–(3) above, the 
following equation is to be initially estimated by panel two stage least 
squares (P2SLS):  
 
PCTCHRPCYjt = a0 + a1DEFYjt + a2FFjt + a3GSFjt + 
a4PROPRITFjt + a5FINFjt + a6TFjt + a7MFjt + a8BFjt + a9IFjt  + u, (4) 
 
where: 
PCTCHRPCYjt = the percent change in the purchasing-power-parity 
adjusted real per capita GDP in nation j in year t; 
a0 = constant;  
DEFYjt = the ratio of the central/federal government budget deficit 
to the GDP in nation j in year t, expressed as a percent; 
FFjt= the value of the fiscal freedom index in nation j in year t; 
GSFjt = the value of the freedom from excessive government size 
index in nation j in year t; 
PROPRITFjt = the value of the property rights freedom index in 
nation j in year t; 
FINFjt = the value of the financial freedom index in nation j in year t; 
TFjt = the value of the trade freedom index in nation j in year t; 
MFjt = the value of the monetary freedom index in nation j in year t; 
BFjt = the value of the business freedom index in nation j in year t; 
IFjt = the value of the investment freedom index in nation j in year t; 
and 
u = stochastic error term 
where t = 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and j = 1,…29. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables considered in the basic 
model are provided in Table 1.  The data sources for the variables in 
the analysis are as follows: PCTCHRPCY (International Monetary 
Fund, 2013); the freedom indices, FF, GSF, PROPRITF, FINF, TF, 
MF, BF, and IF (Heritage Foundation, 2013); and the budget deficit 
ratio, DEFY (OECD, 2013).  
The above system was first estimated using the Fixed Effects Model 
and then  estimated  using the  Random  Effects Model.  Performing  the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
RPCY 26,986 11,663 
PCTCHRPCY 2.59 1.23 
DEFY 4.9 6.7 
FF 59.9 12.1 
GSF  41.1 19.4 
FINF 68.8 17.3 
MF 81.2 6.4 
BF 78.2 11.2 
PROPRITF 76.7 15.8 
IF 76.0 8.4 
TF  80.1 4.9 
 
Hausman test yielded a p-value = 0.0451. Consequently, the system 
was estimated within the context of the Fixed Effects Model. Moreover, 
in each of the subsequent estimations provided in this study, the 
model was first estimated using the Fixed Effects Model and then 
estimated using the Random Effects Model. Performing the Hausman 
(1978) test [phtest (fixed, random)] generated in each of these 
subsequent cases also yielded a p-value < 0.05, so the study actually 
adopts the Fixed Effects Model in all of the estimations.  
The dependent variable reflecting real economic growth per 
capita, PCTCHRPCY, is treated as contemporaneous with the central 
government budget deficit variable, DEFY. Thus a potential 
simultaneity issue arises. Accordingly, the system is estimated by 
P2SLS, with the instrument being the lagged value of the 
unemployment rate of the civilian labor force (OECD, 2013). The 
instrument was chosen because it was found to be highly correlated 
with DEFY, while not being correlated with the error terms in the 
system.   
The P2SLS estimate of equation (4) is provided in column (a) of 
Table 2, in which each of the nine estimated coefficients on 
explanatory variables exhibits the expected sign, with five being 
statistically significant at the 1% level, two being statistically 
significant at the 5% level, and two (TFjt and BFjt) failing to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The F-statistic of 47.15 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength 
of the model.  
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(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Constant -5.32 -5.23 -4.77 -6.88 
DEFY -0.112*** -0.106*** -0.101** -0.123*** 
 (-3.34) (-3.23) (-2.39) (-2.65) 
FF 0.007* 0.007** 0.006* 0.006* 
  (2.11) (2.40) (2.00) (1.99) 
GSF  0.143*** 0.138*** 0.129** 0.185*** 
 (3.24) (3.12) (2.33) (2.58) 
PROPRITF 0.0088*** 0.009*** 0.0089*** 0.008*** 
 (3.58) (4.38) (3.51) (2.72) 
FINF 0.005* 0.006*** 0.004* 0.005* 
 (2.21) (2.73) (2.01) (2.09) 
TF 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (3.43) (3.47) (3.57) (3.43) 
MF 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 
 (6.60) (6.03) (6.99) (5.54) 
BF 0.001 0.002 0.002 ------- 
 (0.43) (0.74) (0.59)  
IF 0.002 0.002 ------ ------- 
 (0.93) (0.96)   
G8DUMMY ------- 0.349*** ------- ------- 
  (2.76)   
F 47.15*** 48.42*** 55.37*** 48.07*** 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***Indicates statistically significant at the 1% 
level; ** indicates statistically significant at the 2.5% level; * indicates statistically 
significant at the 5% percent level. White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected 
standard errors and t-values are reported.  
 
Based on these initial P2SLS results, the per capita real economic 
growth rate in OECD nations over the 2003 through 2008 study 
period (PCTCHRPCY) was, at the 1% statistical significance level, a 
decreasing function of the central government budget deficit 
(DEFYjt). Thus, the higher the budget deficit (expressed as a percent 
of GDP), the lower the percentage growth rate of the (purchasing-
power-parity adjusted) per capita real GDP. This finding is strongly 
suggestive of a net crowding out effect from government budget 
deficits and is thus compatible in principle with several previous 
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empirical studies of earlier time periods and alternative empirical 
frameworks, although these earlier studies did not adopt P2SLS 
estimation (Anderson and Jordan, 1968; Klein, 1972; Carlson and 
Spencer, 1975; Sullivan, 1976; Cebula, 1978, 1995, 2011; Abrams and 
Schmitz, 1978; Zahn, 1978; Arestis, 1979; Guseh, 1997).9 
Based on the results shown in column (a) of Table 2, the per 
capita real economic growth rate in OECD nations over the 2003 
through 2008 study period (PCTCHRPCY) was an increasing 
function of both increased fiscal freedom (FF) in terms of the burden 
of taxation and freedom from the burden of excessive government 
size (GSF) in terms of expenditures. The estimated coefficient on 
FFjt is positive and statistically significant at the 4% level, whereas 
the estimated coefficient on GSFjt is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, an increase in either fiscal freedom 
from the burden of government on the tax/revenue side and/or an 
increase in freedom from the burden of excessive government size 
on the expenditure side results in an increased percentage growth rate 
of per capita real GDP. Of course, these findings also imply that 
reduced levels of FF and/or GSF lead to a decreased per capita real 
economic growth rate. In principle, these outcomes might be expected 
in light of previous studies (Ali, 1997; Barro, 1997; Dawson, 1998; De 
Haan and Siermann, 1998; De Haan and Sturm, 2000; Heckelman 
and Stroup, 2000; Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson, 2006; 
Gwartney and Lawson, 2008), although the latter use different, i.e., 
more aggregated, economic freedom measures. In any case, these two 
results by themselves indicate that a nation pursuing policies that 
reduce fiscal freedom and freedom from excessive government size 
can be expected to experience reduced rates of real economic growth 
per capita. 
Real economic growth per capita (PCTCHRPCY) is not only an 
increasing function of the economic freedoms captured in FF and 
GSF but also an increasing function of property rights freedom (at 
the 1% statistical significance level), financial freedom (at the 3% 
statistical significance level), monetary freedom (at the 1% statistical 
significance level), and trade freedom (at the 1% statistical 
significance level). Thus, overall, it appears that there is new, 
                                                
9 This finding is supportive of David and Scadding (1974) and Friedman (1970; 
1971).   
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additional evidence that increased (higher levels of) economic 
freedoms promote real economic growth.  
To test of the robustness of the model, three alternative 
specifications of the basic model are estimated. In the first test of the 
model, this study endeavors to address a possible concern with the 
analysis of economic growth among OECD nations and whether the 
presence of the G8 nations in the study data set might somehow bias 
the results. To account for this possibility, a binary (dummy) variable, 
G8DUMMY, is introduced into the model. The value of G8DUMMY 
= 1 for each G8 nation observation, and the value of G8DUMMY = 
0 otherwise. Ceteris paribus, it is expected that the coefficient on this 
variable is positive, as a reflection of infrastructure, educational, 
technological, and other economic and institutional advantages 
enjoyed by G8 nations vis-à-vis non-G8 nations. 
The P2SLS estimation results of the expanded model are 
provided in column (b) of Table 2. As shown in column (b), all ten of 
the coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with seven being 
statistically significant at the 1% level; only the coefficients on the IF 
and BF variables fail to be statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Moreover, the F-ratio is 48.42 and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Overall, then, the results in column (b) are consistent with all of 
the robust results in column (a). Thus, these P2SLS results reveal that 
real economic growth (as measured in this study) is a decreasing 
function of the central government budget deficit (expressed as a 
percent of GDP) and an increasing function of fiscal freedom (FF), 
government size freedom (GSF), property rights freedom 
(PROPRITF), financial freedom (FINF), monetary freedom (MF), 
and trade freedom (TF).  Clearly, the presence of the G8DUMMY 
variable does not compromise the basic findings. 
As yet a further test of the robustness of the results in the basic 
model, the model is re-estimated again by P2SLS, this time with both 
G8DUMMY and IF omitted from the model. These estimation 
results, summarized in column (c) of Table 2, yield eight coefficients, 
all of which exhibit the expected signs; in addition, three are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, two are statistically significant 
at the 2.5% level, and two are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
In sum, then, in column (c), there is further evidence on behalf of the 
robust results shown in the basic model.  
Finally, in column (d), the results of a P2SLS estimation of the 
model are provided, in this case with the previously (in this study) 
 R. Cebula / The Journal of Private Enterprise 28(2), 2013, 75–96 89 
 
statistically insignificant variables, IF and BF, as well as the 
G8DUMMY variable all omitted.  All seven of the estimated 
coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with five statistically 
significant at the 1% level and the remaining two statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, there is yet further support for the 
findings that that real economic growth over the 2003–2008 study 
period (among OECD nations) is a decreasing function of the central 
government budget deficit and an increasing function of fiscal 
freedom, government size freedom, property rights freedom, 
financial freedom, monetary freedom, and trade freedom.10   
For the convenience of the reader, the correlation matrix among 
the key explanatory variables in the basic model in equation (4) is 
provided in Table 3. Interestingly, of the 36 correlation coefficients 
provided, those between the following four pairs of variables are 
perhaps of interest: FF and GSF (r = 0.696), BF and IF (r = 0.529), 
BF and PROPRIT (r = 0.533), and IF and PROPRIT (r = 0.539). 
These results imply that in 11% of cases, explanatory variables are 
rather highly correlated. Indeed, of these four cases, three involve IF 
and/or BF. It is little wonder that these two explanatory variables 
perform somewhat weakly in the estimations. Aside from these 
instances, the general pattern of zero-order correlation coefficients in 
Table 3 reveals little of interest or serious concern.  
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix for Model Explanatory Variables 
 DEFY FF GSF PROPRITF FINF TF MF BF IF 
DEFY 1.00         
FF  0.399 1.00        
GSF -0.399 0.696 1.00       
PROPRITF -0.368 -0.387 -0.329 1.00      
FINF -0.138 -0.039 -0.102 0.422 1.00     
TF -0.341 -0.181 -0.275 0.329 0.076 1.00    
MF -0.295 0.179 -0.224 0.462 0.260 0.188 1.00   
BF -0.155 - 0.234 -0.097 0.533 0.309 0.159 0.434 1.00  
IF -0.339 -0.350 -0.323 0.499 0.466 0.161 0.285 0.529 1.00 
 
 
                                                
10 Also noteworthy is the high degree of stability of the coefficients along with their 
respective t-values across the specifications. Such consistency of results also implies 
a high degree of robustness of the basic model.  
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V. Conclusions and Overview  
The P2SLS estimations provided in this study constitute strong 
empirical support for the argument that the greater the central 
government budget deficit as a percent of GDP in OECD nations, 
the slower the percentage per capita real GDP growth rate 
(PCTCHRPCY) in OECD nations. This persistent P2SLS evidence of 
crowding out resulting from deficit-financed central government 
spending is consistent with a number of previous studies (Anderson 
and Jordan, 1968; Klein, 1972; Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Sullivan, 
1976; Cebula, 1978, 1995; Abrams and Schmitz, 1978; Zahn, 1978; 
Arestis, 1979; Guseh, 1997). Thus, among other things, governments 
must be wary of policies that generate large, persistent budget 
deficits. The sustainability of such policies is clearly in question. 
Clearly, the Standard & Poor’s downgrading of U.S. Treasury debt in 
August of 2011 provides support for this perspective. Moreover, as 
recently observed by Sanz (2011), the fiscal adjustments that OECD 
nations are being forced/will be forced to make to get their fiscal 
houses in order will be very challenging.  
In addition, these P2SLS findings strongly imply that pursuing a 
set of public policies that promotes or is at least consistent with 
greater fiscal freedom (FF) from government on the tax/revenue side 
and greater freedom from excessive government size (GSF) on the 
expenditure side are fundamentally compatible with propelling the 
economies of the OECD onto the road to a full and sustainable 
economic recovery. Furthermore, the findings imply that economic 
growth will positively respond to increases in property rights 
freedom, financial freedom, trade freedom, and monetary freedom. 
These findings potentially can be interpreted as a signal for 
policymakers to be very circumspect about, among other things, new 
regulations to be adopted as well as old regulations that remain in 
effect but manifest little usefulness or relevance.11 
Arguably, the United States must become especially cautious in 
the current political climate of continuing its agenda of pursuing 
                                                
11 Regarding fiscal policy actions by OECD nations, the sharp increase in 
government indebtedness and concomitant growth in the size of government 
relative to the size of the economy in several OECD nations during the global 
economic and financial crisis is another serious concern (OECD, 2009; Sanz, 
2011).  
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higher federal personal income tax rates,12 creating or raising other federal taxes, 
and expanding the role of the federal government while incurring large(r) budget 
deficits. Prospective tax and spending policies in the United States 
appear poised to continue generating large federal budget deficits, to 
reduce fiscal freedom, and to reduce freedom from excessive 
government size. The results of the present study strongly suggest 
that such policies, which visibly include the huge federal budget 
deficits currently experienced and still forecasted for the United 
States in coming years, will reduce the rate of per capita real GDP 
growth in the United States. Clearly, the latter would tend to 
compromise U.S. living standards.  
To provide a perhaps broader perspective, then, the empirical 
evidence provided in this empirical study implies strongly that, due to 
its persistent negative impact on per capita real GDP growth in the 
United States, the pattern of massive budget deficits begun under the 
Bush Administration (2001–2009) but greatly expanded under the 
Obama Administration (since 2009) cannot be allowed to continue. 
Likewise, the pattern of declining economic freedom, which also 
began under the Bush Administration (2001–2009) but which became 
greatly exacerbated under the Obama Administration (since 2009) must 
be quickly and significantly reversed. The stakes are high. This dual 
impact on U.S. prosperity, jobs, and living standards will be 
economically and indeed socially devastating if permitted to continue 
and will ultimately relegate the United States to the status of a 
second-class economic citizen in the global economy.   
It is perhaps timely to refer to the classic four-book set by Adam 
Smith (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, in which he observed that government policies were likely to 
destroy rather than create wealth. It is the “invisible hand” of free 
markets that leads to the efficient allocation of resources in those 
                                                
12 Interestingly, raising income taxes on the “rich” or “super-rich” in the United 
States has been and continues to be an intensely debated issue. An important part 
of this debate, all of which lies beyond the scope of the present study, is the elusive 
problem of defining the term “rich.” Interestingly, it has been found that that 
higher income tax rates tend to elevate the degree of income tax evasion 
(Clotfelder, 1983; Feige, 1994; Cebula, Coombs, and Yang, 2009); furthermore, 
federal government-spending-driven budget deficits also have been shown to 
increase income tax evasion (Cebula and Coombs, 2009). Such tax evasion 
behaviors would directly contribute to the federal government’s financial woes by 
reducing tax collections.  
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markets. This long-term perspective appears to elude many of those 
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